The problem of normativity in Honneth’s recognition theory

Abstract

The text intends to make an evaluation of the possible normative
answers in Honneth’s theory of recognition. I identify three major answers
in Honneth’s works: a first is teleological, a second is anthropologic ant
the third is anchored in formal ethics. I want to show the insufficiency
of the first two answers because they are based on contingent elements
and strong dependent on particular contexts. The third answer presents
more complete elements for the development of a normative theory,
or also a theory of justice. Honneth’s decisive point is the search for a 

balance between normative and immanent elements, with normative
reconstruction as method. What I want to show is that Honneth’s
criteria, namely gain of individuation and socialization, need a moral
grounding that can be provided by the criterion of equality or equal
respect for individual autonomy. This development is presented by
Honneth himself, so I want only to identify and problematize the
responses of German philosopher. The investigation developed here
is directed towards thinking Honneth’s theory as critical without failing
to value morality.
Keywords: Normativity. Recognition. Axel Honneth.