

Nova York – Buenos Aires: Soluções diferentes para o mesmo problema. Terrorismo e Cidadania

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RESUMO

Conceituar o terrorismo é uma questão complicada. Alguns teóricos o definem por seus efeitos, outros por suas causas. No presente artigo, o conceito de terrorismo é baseado na aproximação dialética entre causas e efeitos. Dessa maneira, o caso World Trade Center apresenta-se confrontado com os ataques ocorridos em Buenos Aires em 1992 e 1994. Enquanto este foi apresentado como um ataque à comunidade judaica, aquele foi apresentado pela mídia como uma ofensa à Humanidade. Naturalmente, Argentina e Estados Unidos mantêm políticas diversas para lidar com o terrorismo. Em perspectiva, se pode especular que o terrorismo parece ser um assunto profundamente relacionado à mobilidade e ao monopólio da alienação simbólica. Isso suscita uma questão muito interessante, que a literatura especializada ainda não respondeu: por que o 11 de Setembro é mais importante do que outros eventos similares? Nesse contexto, a reflexão proposta visa não só desvendar o quebra-cabeça em torno do terrorismo, mas também discorrer de forma convincente sobre as razões pelas quais o turismo é, economicamente, um pressuposto para o advento do terrorismo e vice-versa.

Palavras-chave: Turismo.
Terrorismo. Economia.
Argentina. Estados Unidos

ABSTRACT

NEY YORK–BUENOS AIRES: Different solutions to the same problem. Terrorism and citizenry. The concept of terrorism seems to be very difficult to define. Some extent, some scholars define terrorism by its effects while others by its causes. The fact is that in this paper the concept of terrorism is based on the dialectic connection between effects and causes. In so doing, the World Trade Center's case is sharply contrasted to the attacks suffered in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994. Whereas the former was framed as an attack to Argentinian Jewish community the former was disseminated by mass-media as an offense to humankind. Of course, Argentina and United States maintain now diverse policies to deal with

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terrorism. In perspective, one might speculate terrorism seems to be a deeper issue related to mobility and the monopoly of symbolic alienation. This begs a more than interesting question that specialized literature has not answered yet: why 9/11 was further important than other similar events? Under such a context, the present conceptual research not only aims to unravel the puzzle around terrorism and tourism but also explain convincingly the reasons why tourism is economically the precondition for the advent of terrorism and vice-versa.

INTRODUCTION

The connection between terrorism and travel seems not to be new. During the Roman Empire, many tribes, which rejected subjugation to a stronger power, attacked Roman travelers during their journeys. In doing so, insurgents showed not only their reluctance to respect a stronger State but also questioned the political interests of Rome. The high degree of vulnerability of Roman travelers because of their wealth made them fertile targets for pillaging. Empires, Roman and others, build mobility to their own epicenter. Imperial mobility has two goals: on one hand, it facilitates faster military presence in case of revolt; on the other, it enhances the trade and commerce flowing to and from the imperial center.

For that reason, it is not surprising that Jewish, Germanic, and Celtic tribes assaulted travelers in defiance of Roman hegemony. Despite changes since the Roman Empire, after 11 September 2001 (9/11), American travelers perceived themselves targets of terrorists in Middle East. American tourists reduced considerably their travels abroad because they consider the world, or at least some parts of it, as dangerous. This aspect has been widely studied by many researches and scholars in tourism and hospitality fields.

The present paper explores the symbolic influence of 9/11 and other similar events such as the bombings of Israel's embassy and AMIA (Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina) in 1992 and 1994 respectively in Buenos Aires. Unlike the World Trade Center and Pentagon assaults, the Argentine attacks have not taken broader international dimensions. The case of 9/11 and the attacks against Jewish community targets in Argentina followed different paths. While Americans promptly saw themselves as international targets, which affected their views about the world, in Argentina the bombings fell into oblivion.

Our thesis here is that the attention to 9/11 as a mediated event and the response of US authorities paved the way for the sacralization of the space where these buildings were - so-called Ground Zero. In Argentina, in contrast, a counter-process of desacralization moved the local community to avoid and silence the Jewish community.

TERRORISM, COUNTER-TERRORISM, AND STATE POLICIES

In the wake of 9/11, many countries adopted more strict policies to control and reinforce the security of their borders (BARRO, 1991; POLLINS, 1989; ABADIE AND GARDEAZABAL, 2003; PHILLIPS, 2008). Initially, those countries that shared with the United States a Western position in the world, such as Spain, Great Britain, and Australia gave their support to an international coalition

(ALTHEIDE, 2009; BASSI, 2010). They identified terrorism as the main threat for the West. Robertson (2002) described terrorism as the primary threat for Western State's security in 21st century.

First and foremost, this point of view suggests that a current definition of terrorism is needed simply because the pervasive nature of the term for national policy. Such practice have provoked opposing viewpoints about terrorism and counter-terrorism strategies. Some scholars encourage nation states to take faster and proactive counter-terrorism policies (FUKUYAMA, 1989; HUNTINGTON, 1993; 1997 KRISTOL AND KAGAN, 1996; KEPEL, 2002). Others see their counter-terrorism as totalitarianism or Western imperialism (ALTHEIDE, 2006; 2009; BAUDRILLARD, 2006; SMAW, 2008; SONTAG, 2002; SKOLL, 2007, 2010). Jack N. Kondrasuk (2005), a management expert in the Business School at University of Portland, USA, said that the United States has built a biased image of terrorism after 9/11. The ordinary people of US have been encouraged to ethnocentrically proclaim themselves as "Americans" with terrorism as their primary public worry.

It became a main focus of presidential debates in 2004.

Kondrasuk (2005) defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetuated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience" (p. 646). Similar to Bruce Hoffman - a Pentagon-linked, RAND Corporation writer - Kondrasuk says terrorists should be understood in the following way: A non military group pursuing political and religious causes who operate in a clandestine way without a publicly-known headquarters threatening to commit act of extreme violence, who target vulnerable civilians to promote fears in a broader audience, with goals aimed at influencing top governmental decision making.

Other attempts to define terrorism, in a more heuristic vein, use a less control oriented or state-centric and more social scientific approach. Defining terrorism for scientific-research should elude the influence of officials and state. The problem is in implications. Much as the word 'communism' was both politically weightier and more restricted in meaning in the popular discourse in the 1950s than its denotation of the time so 'terrorism' has gained weight and shrunk in range of meaning since the 9/11.

In the case of terrorism, a broad and ordinary understanding encourages more comprehensive and precise analyses. More than thirty years ago, the US Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism proposed a serviceable definition as follows. "Terrorism is a tactic or technique by means of which a violent act or threat thereof is used for the purpose of creating overwhelming fear for coercive purposes" (TASK FORCE 1976, p.3). Shortening it does no harm so a more concise version is Terrorism (n.): A coercive tactic using fear through violence or its threat. The background for the national Task Force was social turmoil accompanied by an increase in civil disorders during the early 1970s. The Task Force noted numerous airplane hijackings, bombings, and riots in cities in the United States.

Just before the 9/11 attacks, the former staff director of the Task Force weighed in on the definitional controversy. H.H.A.Cooper (2001, p.881) begins by quoting Raymond Cohen (1990, p.41-42). "A living language has no existence independent of culture. It is not the loom of culture but its data bank. As such, it serves the needs, past and present, of a given community. As those needs change, language evolves to accommodate them." Cooper goes on to offer an elegant definition: "[T]errorism is the intentional generation of massive fear by human beings for the purpose of securing or maintaining control over other human beings" (COOPER 2001, p.883). Cooper's 2001

definition does not require violence, but stresses control more than mere coercion. These changes improve the 1976 version as they open the possibility that terrorism is a condition, not merely an event. A short hand version allows researchers to recognize terrorism when they see it. According to that criterion, terrorism occurs when someone makes people fearful in order to control them. The three elements are intent, fear, and control (cf., CRENSHAW 1983, 1995). Definitions matter, and action oriented definitions lead to different consequences than those of a more scientific nature (SKOLL 2007b, p.3).

MARTYRDOM AND THE MESSAGE OF TERRORISM

Terrorism scholars and experts focus on martyrdom as a central aspect. In the Middle East practices of martyrdom harken back 700 years to the Crusades. Conceptualized first as a sacramental act, martyrdom ensured a life of happiness in heaven for all warriors who would give their life in sacrifice. Martyrdom remains a slippery concept. It can imply or promise honor, but it can also serve as a symbol of *ressentiment*, which is an outgrowth of Nietzsche's slave mentality (NIETZSCHE 1992).

It is in the latter sense, the Nietzschean slave mentality of *ressentiment*, that George W. Bush said that the attackers, whom he identified as members and followers of Al Qaeda, "hate our freedoms" (BUSH 2001). Bush argued that the deprived and oppressed wanted to bring "us" (presumably Americans, the United States, or some other abstraction) down to their level. According to Bush, terrorists, especially radical Muslim terrorists, wanted to destroy freedom because they did not have any. The Bush conceit, in the literary sense of conceit as strained metaphor, rationalized the US-led, Western Global War on Terror, or GWOT, in military-speak. Victims became martyrs.

The bombings of the Israeli embassy and the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA), an Argentine Jewish community centre, had different, if not diametrically opposite consequences. Whereas US victims became martyrs and the site sacralised, the Argentine bombing victims were pushed into obscurity and the targets ignored and shunned. In the Argentine case, attention shifted to other matters quickly, and public opinion tended more to shun, even recoil from, the Jewish community. The site of the bombings was desacralized.

Martyrdom, *ressentiment*, and retaliation are necessarily relational. Power and wealth are forever the twin fulcrums of the relation. A factor of connection between suicide, vulnerability and terrorism is tourism. There are other measures, of course, but tourism fits well with these two sets of terrorist incidents. Another viewpoint, therefore, sees terrorism as asymmetric warfare, the weak versus the strong, both of which use terror. This viewpoint emphasizes that terrorism is a tactic in conflicts, especially armed conflicts in which morale is crucial. As Tacitus put it: "In battle, the eyes are defeated first".

Fundamentalists, as Zizek (2009) put it, in any culture, are convinced of their own beliefs, and therefore do not respond with violence to the presence of otherness. Modern terrorists have concrete, usually political in the broad sense, goal. They seek vulnerable victims to persuade the powerful states that their claims should be negotiated. Youth and aesthetic are two cultural values widely facilitated by late capitalism and the modern State. Therefore, women and children are often terrorist targets.

Moreover, Skoll (2007a) points out that political violence in our days works as a virus going from one to another guest expanding the infection:

[...] the terrorist victimization is often perceived by the terrorist as a sacrifice. The sacrifice can consist of attaching innocent people from the adversary's camp or of a terrorist blowing himself or herself up in the midst of a group of guilty enemies. In that case, he sees himself as a martyr. The dimension of martyrdom links it to the activity that some scholars see as the most fundamental form of religiosity: the sacrifice. (SCHMID, 2004, p. 210)

THE ROLE OF TOURISM

At some extent, the problem of terrorism is associated to intolerance and hate. Whenever tourism contributes to local economy there is less probabilities to develop a hostile reaction against foreigners (AZIZ, 1995; PRIDEAUX, 2005). P. Tarlow (2011) has evidenced how important are the policies of state to prevent terrorism attacks. Undoubtedly, we are living "the age of terrorism". For Aziz, tourism represents for terrorist-mind a sign of ostentation, the code of West that means corruption and evilness. Secondly, the importance of tourists for modern states may destabilize their legitimacy (AZIZ, 1995).

In this token, Lepp and Gibson (2008) argue that travel seems to be circumscribed to two contrasting tendencies, the sensation or novelty seeking and risk aversion. As well as the nationality of tourists, the type of psychological personality plays a crucial role at the time of determining risk perception. The sense of safety is vital for tourism industry. In tourism and hospitality fields, risks are being analyzed from a quantitative perspective. This happens because scholars assume risk is an important aspect of travels. Previously determined by a previous decision-making process, people face their own risk by selecting not only the destination for their holidays but also their means of transport. From that moment onwards, the validity for their election is subject to a set of potential hazards that can affect the visitor's experience (HALL, TIMOTHY AND DUVAL, 2003).

M. Yuan (2005) clarifies that trauma provoked by WTC can generate serious consequences for tourism. People tend to avoid the places that remind some traumatic events. 9/11 undoubtedly woke up an extreme fear in American and British because they were international and mobile targets abroad (SACKETT & BOTTERIL, 2006; YUAN, 2005; WONG & YEAH, 2009).

Tourism and hospitality were among the most affected industries after the 9/11 attacks. Peattie, Clarke, and Peattie (2005) call into question two relevant points of risk research: safety and security. Whereas the former characterizes to any physical harm that can be directed against tourists in accidents, the latter refers to the potential dangers in which a visitor can be involved as for example an assault.

Tourists are potentially vulnerable to risk because they are strangers (PEATTIE, CLARKE, AND PEATTIE, 2005). Mobility opens new channels towards the unknown that re-centers vulnerability by placing people out of their homes. The supposed weakness of trade and tourism in reaction to terrorism should be revisited when one reviews the annual flows of tourists in the world.

For instance, J. M Castaño (2005) dwells on the numbers of arrivals from 2000 to 2003 questioning the previous belief that terrorism threatens tourism. Cities like Mombasa, New York, Madrid,

London, Bali and Cairo have experienced notable downfalls in the arrivals, but recovered considerably after a time. In contrast, R. Bianchi (2007) insists that tourism plays a pervasive role functional to the hegemonic interests in as much as it condition risk perception, or fear, as an efficient mechanism for social control over periphery. The ongoing state of insecurity created by the so-called "terrorism" corresponds with a political logic of exclusion and discrimination against otherness. Based on the assumptions that risk-related theories generate a sentiment of paranoia which is self-defeating for tourists destinations, Bianchi describes convincingly how the bridge between white (tourists) and non-white (migrants) travelers have been enlarged afterwards 9/11.

UNITED STATES AND THE MUSLIM WORLD

Travel entails the possibility of an encounter with otherness that is not always nice. Etymologically, hospitality and hostility share a similar root. The technology that makes possible mobility can also be used by terrorists. In this section, we will address the work edited by Ernesto López, *Writing on Terrorism*, which constitutes a most important contribution of South American scholars to an understanding of how terrorism works.

O. Ianni examines the roots of terrorism from a sociological perspective. He starts from the assumption that the spirit of terrorism mutates from one State to another. He suggests that terrorism should be defined as political violence. Terrorism is not an end, but the means to achieve certain goals. The Anglo-American fundamentalism that underlies the War On Terror, the so-called Crusader spirit, is a result of the pseudo-thesis of ever-expanding boundaries and a claim of exceptionalism. Both are rooted in myths promoted amidst American people.

Exceptionalism claims that, unlike other countries, American society remained impermeable to the most trenchant effects of terrorism until the 9/11 attack. Before this tragedy, Americans were unfamiliar with news and political issues beyond the boundaries of their countries. Being American conferred a right of exclusivity often associated with mass consumption.

Leisure and consumption were two key factors that generated resentment and despair in peripheral countries - perceived as the sources of terrorism. Secondly, predestination and pietism played a pivotal role in the need of material and symbolic expansion of the USA in the world. The efforts to destroy the political terrorism emanating from the Middle-East have profound counter-effects for the United States since the current policies against terrorism follow a dogmatic spirit. Ianni links history, the manipulation of narratives, and power-will. Terrorism as a conceptual connotation speaks not only to the behavior of certain insurgent groups but also to the fear among privileged groups who revert to these terms whenever someone defies their interests. Quite aside from this, it is clear that terrorism is based not only on a wider fear but a sentiment that does not recognize visible boundaries.

Saint-Pierre delves into the meanings of terrorism as asymmetric warfare. According to Saint-Pierre, terrorism has three facets: a) tactical, b) strategic and c) political. Tactical terrorism aims at gaining attention from the State through a maximization of victims and destruction. The strategic level operates in a symbolic spectrum, wherein survivors and spectators experience a deeper sentiment of vulnerability because the event reminds them that the State was unable to protect the citizenry from an outsider attack.

The vulnerability of potential victims is of paramount importance for terrorism. First and foremost, victims represent the impotence of nation-state to defend its own flock. Secondly, the symbolic effects of terrorism work in conjunction with fear and panic precisely among people not directly touched by the event. The ever increasing sentiment of discontent, despair, and fright lead the State to accept the terrorists' claims. This is exactly what Saint Pierre means by the political aspect of terrorism. The vulnerability of Western tourists often is highlighted as the precondition for terrorism as a way to shorten the axis of power and negotiate directly with the State.

Most likely, the vulnerability of the citizens is the primary criteria of terrorists to select their potential victims, but it is not the only one. Tourism, mobility and mass consumption are considered forms of corruption that characterize the moral decline of West. Western tourists represent for terrorists an undesired presence of a dominant power in the holy land (a sacred space), which will be repelled. Even if Saint-Pierre warns that there are two types of terrorism whose interests do not always converge, terrorism should be considered as an attempt to gain attention by violence.

While systematic terrorism makes specific demands by selecting a short range of victims for their attack - for example ETA or IRA - random terrorism seeks the maximum degree of destruction of property and loss of human lives. It is important not to lose the sight that unlike random terrorism, which wants to destabilize a previous political order, systematic terrorism opts to fight for a territorial autonomy defined by specific interests and methodologies.

MASS MEDIA COVERAGE

The 21st century began with the hijacking of civil airplanes, which were then crashed into the World Trade Centre (WTC) and the Pentagon. A fourth plane crashed in Pennsylvania after passengers confronted the hijackers. This event made clear that the most powerful of Western nations was as vulnerable to terrorist attack as were any of its developing neighbors to the south.

This sudden event was immediately disseminated throughout the world via mass media. Continuing coverage in subsequent weeks contrasted images of the World Trade Center in ruins with others such as the struggles for Palestinian independence. September 11, 2001 marks the day when the security and risk boundaries between First and Third Worlds blurred. Media coverage during this period contributed a reinforcement of prior negative stereotypes against Islamic cultures throughout Europe and America.

Based her studies on Atocha's attack in Madrid, T. Sabada discusses ways in which journalists and the media covered this event in comparison with 9/11. Specifically, she is interested in how the same "fact" that can be interpreted in two completely different ways depending on the audience. Under framing theory, many Anglo-American scholars have discussed to what extent mass media influence public opinion. However, little has been done with this approach in the Spanish speaking world.

Sabada's thesis follows both qualitative and quantitative approach to investigate media framing. Terrorism seizes upon violence as a way of garnering media attention and is a highly effective topic for media and its efforts to manage public opinion. The attacks of 9/11 shifted not only the form of news coverage, but also served the terrorist goal of perpetuating fear. Sabada argues that "reality" is largely based on what people believe to be real, drawing on the Chicago School of sociology,

specifically W. I. and D. S. Thomas (1928). However, what role “reality” plays in the development of such social scientific approaches remains unaddressed.

Sabada rejects the idea of a universal conscience. , The analysis presumes instead that the meaning of events is oriented to a cognitive-structural mind that allows people to redirect (internally) similar events while discarding others in a non-linear manner. Framing theory evolved away from earlier, hypodermic models using direct and causal influence. Still, some scholars are convinced that journalism transforms public sentiment. Recently, a wave of research has sought to understand how people select the information which is most useful for their own purposes.

Sabada argues that the process of framing encompasses three different stages: **1.** diagnosis, **2.** forecasting, and **3.** motivation. Many unexpected events are censored by officials to protect public opinion and avoid panic. Sometimes journalists are obliged to remain silent when public security is at stake. At other times the media attempt to enhance social cohesion and the expense of a third party or outsider group. Usually this is carried out to the detriment of ethnic minorities, expatriates or other out-groups. Solutions or alternative pathways are often proposed following “diagnosis’ into a second stage known as “forecasting”. Ultimately, in cases such as 9-11, what Sabada finds is that media produce a kind of synergy which produces citizen participation in a way that promotes the misunderstanding of the Other.

Underpinning these efforts is the widely accepted wisdom that media institutions should, in moments of instability, be practiced with responsibility. Sabada provides the example of the historical reaction of people in Spain after the 1977 assassination of Miguel Angel Blanco (National Deputy of the Popular Party). The Blanco shooting was deployed to reinforce popular solidarity against terrorism. Spaniards across the country were brought together, with the help of the media, to support radical (police and military) solutions to the Basque pro-independence movement. Yet people in different countries may respond differently to similar events despite a similar handling of the events by the media.

Sabada points to the similar coverage but very different popular response, to the attacks of 9/11 versus those on the Madrid commuter trains. As it turned out it was much more difficult to create a unified and coherent frame for the attack in Madrid. In America, following 9/11, Washington found it much easier to manipulate media coverage of the event which led to a more singular voice in reply to the event. In Spain, by falling back on the old “blame the Basques” rhetoric backfired as no one really believed they were responsible. It seemed only the desperate act of a government facing an election.

THE WORLD TRADE CENTER AND PENTAGON IN US HISTORY

Terrorism became a public and politicized issue in the 1980 presidential campaign, as Ronald Reagan used it to defeat the incumbent Jimmy Carter. The World Trade Center bombing of 1993 and the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995 reinvigorated it as a public worry. 9/11 completed the public relations campaign that allowed a new enemy to replace Communism and the Soviet Union (SKOLL 2010). Unlike other cases such as Egypt, Bali, Buenos Aires, 9/11 defined the way the West contemplated the Middle East. Muslims and Muslim-appearing ethnic minorities suffered death threats (WELCH 2006). Television continually showed images of the towers in flames. Some commentators spoke of the fourth World War.

After a tension filled hiatus of nine days from 11 September to 20 September, the US Government elaborated a systematic strategy to blame Al Qaeda, Afghanistan, and close on their heels, Iraq for the tragedy. The preventive war initiated by George W. Bush regime directed the hostility within and beyond the country. In parallel, the World Trade Center site became in a symbol of nationalism even beyond bin Laden's death. Public transport and travel industry were seriously affected. Travelers developed a strong aversion to travel (FLOYD AND PENNINGTON GRAY, 2004; YUAN, 2005). Whereas terrorism was not new in the world, nor even in the United States, 9/11 concentrated symbolic force so as to constitute the end of an era (BAUDRILLARD, 2006).

The site of the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center has become sacralized, among other things, as a tourist destination. In this it refers and recuperates as the sites of natural disasters, to memorialize and marked as a sacred space of the pride, sacrifice, and innocence. Temporarily at least, the 9/11 attack abated an accelerating social fragmentation. As a measure of renewed social cohesion in the face of an externalized enemy Other, the fear emerged of travelling abroad. Most tourism and hospitality industries not only stopped down in a short-run but also paved the pathways for the advent of unemployment and recession. The extreme and growing wealth disparity that marked the economic life of US was rechanneled to the industry of war by mobilizing all material and symbolic resources to defeat what was called as "the axis of evil" (BUSH, 2000).

The role played by travels and tourism in this process can be understood in two ways. At a preliminary stage, the travels were interrupted (Hall, 2003). Public opinion was seized by panic and uncertainty. The air-space labeled as dangerous played a crucial role in the multiplication of diverse phobias during this period. In addition, as information about terrorism increased, mass media nourished a discourse that pointed to Osama bin Laden as responsible for the events. Once this process was consolidated, a second stage emphasized travelling throughout US as form of patriotism.

Underpinned by the proposition that the panic of terrorism is stronger among survivors, traveling meant to show the world that the United States was on its feet again. Unlike Spain's case, dissident and other more independent voices were not sufficient to break this one-sided discourse simply because it was facilitated efficiently by State. Furthermore, technologies of a visual aesthetic contributed to the creation of a mediated image of 9/11 that obscured similar events in other parts of the planet. The bombings of the Israeli embassy and AMIA in Argentina present a sharp contrast.

THE ISRAEL'S EMBASSY AND AMIA ATTACKS IN BUENOS AIRES

The bombings to AMIA and Israel's embassy in Buenos Aires differed from 9/11 in many senses. The attack to Israel's embassy occurred 17 March of 1992 at 2.42 pm by means of a pick-up driven by a suicide bomber, loaded with explosives. The embassy, a Catholic Church and a nearby school were completely obliterated by the explosion. Twenty-nine persons lost their lives and 242 were wounded. The Israeli diplomatic mission was shocked by the attack and demanded clarification. Afterward, Israel, in cooperation with Argentina, sent specialists to investigate. They concluded that the planning came from the tri-border area of Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina. In hindsight, a new onslaught against Jewish community would be imminent in two years.

On 18 July of 1994, the AMIA (Argentine Israelite Mutual Association) faced its deadliest attack by a bombing killing 85 people and injuring hundreds. Over the years, the case was characterized by contradictories, accusations of cover-up, and corruption. At a first glance, the suspects (local

connection) were members of the police but there was insufficient proof, at least in 2004. On 25 October 2006, Argentine prosecutors Alberto Nisman and Marcelo Martinez Burgos formally accused the government of Iran of directing the bombing, and the Hezbollah militia of carrying it out. According to the prosecution's claims in 2006, Argentina had been targeted by Iran after Buenos Aires' decision to suspend a nuclear technology transfer contract to Tehran. This however, has been under dispute, because this contract was never terminated, and Iran and Argentina were negotiating on restoration of full cooperation on all agreements from early 1992 till 1994, when the bombing occurred. These events, unlike 9/11, were not resolved by the Justice ministry, but generated a serious diplomatic dispute between Argentina and Iran.

A convincing explanation about the reason for this outcome is not easy. Argentina, like the rest of South America first experienced the pervasive effects of terrorism and totalitarianism during the 1970s. The psychological immediacy of public opinion regarding the Jewish community was not enough to wake up a broader national sentiment as counter-response to terrorists. Hostility, instead, was rechanneled to the core of Argentine history, to the dictators that perpetrated crimes against humanity (or genocide as some scholars preferred). The "obediencia debida y punto final" pardons, given by Raul Alfonsin and Carlos Menem; once abolished, paved the pathways for reassuming new judgments or prosecutions against commanders such as Videla, Acosta, Etchekolatz, Camps and so forth.

Fears take diverse shapes depending on the context and historical background of each society. While the AMIA and Israel's embassy enhanced the social cohesion within Jewish community in Buenos Aires, it dispersed the support of Argentines in general due to fear. Unlike 9/11, these events accelerated the pre-existing social fragmentation and individualism. Crime, unemployment, and corruption surfaced as two of the greatest concerns of public opinion in Argentina. American citizens after 9/11 showed considerable reluctance to fly abroad, simply because they became a new and vulnerable target of terrorism world-wide. Argentines tried to avoid the Jewish community with similar connotations.

Even though much has been written about the terrorist attacks in Buenos Aires, these studies are not formal academic papers, published under a process of peer-blind review, but trade books or journalists' columns. One of the best is *War in Pieces* by N. Greenberg who explored how these events were presented by media as fragmented settings of supposed tragedy that remained alien to the national sentiment.

Soon after the 1994 bombing, Moishe Cohen, the cultural director of AMIA, gathered several dozen leading sculptors and architects at the site of colonial ruins south of Buenos Aires. Cohen and others had witnessed the hemorrhaging of the Jewish community since the attack. Jews had stopped attending synagogue or even sending their children to school. He asked the group of artists to study the ruins and to imagine a new space that would welcome people back. The objective was not to alleviate fears among Jews, but to show to the greater public "que estamos presentes" he said, "that we are here" (Cohen "Interview"). But the design of the rebuilt AMIA building reveals a new relationship with the city. Separated from the street by a fortified security entrance that acts as a blast wall, the new building looms over the original site, which appears vacant, presenting itself as a kind of fortress. The passersby are not allowed into the building without a scheduled appointment and proof of identity. Taxis cannot stop in front of the building and photos are not allowed. The

question invariably is whether the Jewish community in Argentina will ever recover the sense of security and purpose it once felt” (GREEN, 2010, p. 87).

In sum, Green points to social prejudices against the Jewish community for some, corruption and indifference for others.

Entel has argued that in Latin America, fear is not related to terrorist attacks or bio-nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Rather, unemployment associated with increasing drug consumption is leading excluded sectors toward a widespread feeling of self-hatred. Since ethnic minorities are manipulated as scapegoats in order for societies to reduce their own anxiety, Entel demonstrates that there is a social memory of fear, enrooted in discourse that can be disabled or enabled according to political interests. If in the past, the state was actively responsible for the disappearance of political dissidents, now, under democracy, contradictory policies lead to an appalling sedation of potential dissidence to poverty, violence, and political corruption. Previously in Latin America the fear of physical disappearance under military dictatorships has been replaced with the fear of poverty, social exclusion, and malnutrition. The fear of political repression has been replaced by economic fears which might end in starvation for the most disadvantaged. In Argentina, the fear of military dictatorship from the 1970s has been replaced by new worries associated with unemployment and economic instability as a result of the collapse of Argentinean economy one decade ago. Metaphorically speaking, indoctrination policies linked to the disappearance of people has been changed by a symbolic way of censorship. Nowadays, many people believe that their nation-state does not provide the necessary support for the widespread satisfaction of the most basic needs (Entel, 2007). If the reasoning of Entel is correct, this would explain not only how the social fragmentation prevented fear from turning into panic, but the valorization of the security of personal property and fear of local crime. Highly integrated societies are fertile sources for panic in contrast to less cohesive ones. Paradoxically, the fear of crime in the latter overwhelms the worries of potential terrorist bombings. Besides, during the 1970s, US diplomacy envisaged terrorism as a more than efficient instrument to destabilize local governments in Third world, not only in South America but also in Africa and Middle East. But after 9/ 11, the United States itself faced terrorism on its home ground. The latter doubtless a blowback from decades of imperialist adventures abroad, thus validating the previous assumption that terrorism seems to be a product derived from imperialism (JOHNSON 2004).

9/11 VERSUS THE EMBASSY AND AMIA BOMBINGS IN BUENOS AIRES

The following scheme will help readers to understand how 9/11 has been constructed and memorialized by American Society:

1 The event attracted the attention of the entire world and international mass media. After the attacks, many media and international journalists covered the disaster world-wide. The first super-power and world hegemon, the United States, had been under attack. As never before, Americans suffered on their soil a terrorist attack in which four commercial airplanes, with civilians on board, were employed against another civilian target.

2 American society responded against an external foe, embodied in the role of evil. There ensued a mythical fight between the good (USA) and the Evil (the enemies of USA). A dichotomy of this caliber characterized the elections and politics campaigns in 2004.

3 Since the mass transport system and travel industry, especially air space, were the means of terrorists, there was a widespread panic about travel abroad or even domestically. As a result, tourism and hospitality were seriously threatened to the extent of seeing a President (Bush) overtly encouraging his citizens to visit the USA as a sign of nationalism.

4 The World Trade Center made the identity of perpetrators visible; the names of involved persons were public. Immediately after the event, not only did Al-Qaeda boast authorship of the attack, but also the FBI realized that the perpetrators were living and being trained in US for months previously. Consequently, the US government arrested and prosecuted tens of thousands of illegal immigrations, many only with technical visa violations, and tightened control of the frontiers. New visa requirements to visit US were implemented, first for peripheral countries.

5 Unlike other local attacks, 9/11 transformed the subject of terrorism. This can be reflected not only in the number of studies and book published but also the movies made with this theme (MCCARTNEY, 2008; SACKETT AND BOTTERILL, 2006; PRIDEAUX, 2005; KOZAK, CROTTS AND LAW, 2007; YUAN, 2005).

6 The discourse of terrorism, or more precisely the discourse of the war on terror, followed a script to use fear in support of the re-election of G. W. Bush. This suggests that 9/11 effects exerted considerable influence in politics domestically, and at the same time it re-formed international policies and relations.

7 With the passing of years, the psychological fear proper of this event set the pace of terror. The discourse of terror was manipulated by all authorities, no matter the political affiliation, Republicans and Democrats agreed on a consensus to coordinate efforts against terrorism. Although the Bush administration was certainly placed under the lens of scrutiny, American democracy and the institutions of government were not criticized. Unlike the case of Spain where the authorities took advantage of the situation for their own credit, or in Buenos Aires Argentina where authorities trivialized the attacks, in the United States both major parties consciously elaborated a narrative based on the brotherhood and patriotism.

8 Economically speaking, tourism stagnated only briefly, and then gained further strength with the passing of years. Now, New York City is one of the most attractive tourist destinations and especially Ground Zero, the site of the Twin Towers. This suggests that even though tourism may have been constrained by negative events, post-event it recovered after a reasonable lapse of time.

Before 9/11 many Americans overtly stated their worries about urban crime. This issue became muted by other concerns related to homeland security and terrorism. In contrast, the evolution and emotional impact of the AMIA and the Israeli embassy on Argentine public opinion followed the sequence below.

1) The event did not draw international attention. Rather, it was a local case. Mass media opted to cover news based on crimes and murders. Unlike United States where the news aimed at enhancing the homeland and personal securities, in Argentina the news focused on the property as primary resource. Academics commented on crime as a sign of social fragmentation. Most

Argentineans didn't feel the attack was against Argentina as US citizens did. As stated above, Jewish are seen as outsiders.

2) In sharp contrast with United States, with the passing of years in Buenos Aires passerby's tried to avoid synagogues and Jewish cultural associations. This represented serious failures to create an external enemy and consequently the hostility was implicitly re-directed against the society.

3) The mass transport system and airspace were not involved in these attacks. Tourism and hospitality industries remained untouched from these events. Thousands of Argentines visited the country and travelling abroad surged. The currency exchange of 1 to 1 and the convertibility system made destinations in the United States and Europe more accessible for Argentine tourists than other times. Argentina became in a country of tourists and had a serious failure in capturing local demand. More interested in centers as Miami or Ibiza, Argentines flew outside Argentina on their holidays.

4) To date, the names of perpetrators are unknown. Locally, Argentine authorities showed respect to the Jewish Community, but failed to investigate this event in depth. Argentine society felt these attacks were not against them but to the Jewish community.

5) Even though authorities immediately employed significant courses of actions to identify the perpetrator of this crime, Argentina did not develop a systematic framework to fight against terrorism.

6) Moved by the action of Mass media, Argentine public opinion felt terrorism did not represent a serious Threat. Rather, Argentines remain more concerned about crime, poverty, and unemployment than future bombings.

7) Political corruption and controversies involved the government of former President Carlos Saul Menem and his ministers. To some extent, no real inquiries have been followed by Argentine government to reveal not only the causes but also the actors who locally participated in these two unresolved tragedies.

8) Today there is a memorial set up in place of where the building stood. In the memorial plaza stand 21 trees and seven benches in memory of the victims. A plaque describing the event and listing the victims is located in the memorial in both Hebrew and Spanish. Nonetheless, this memorial has not sufficient strength to be internalized as a shared cause of all Argentines. After these events, the AMIA and Israel's embassy were re-located to other sites for security purposes. Inversely to 9/11, Argentines were witness to a broader process of "desacralization".

If in the United States Ground Zero became a symbol of patriotism, in Argentina these sites were silenced and hidden. This happened because the discourse around AMIA and the Jewish community were not internalized by other classes and groups of Argentine society. This was not because racism or xenophobia, but by fear. The diverse authorities and governments have not supported the idea of a large memorial to the tragedy. Patriotism and nationalism have not been activated. Instead, during the presidency of Nestor Kirchner and Cristina F. de Kirchner, his wife, terrorism remained rooted in the memory of the state violence during the bloody military dictatorships from 1976-1982

that ended with Malvinas/Falkland's War. The "terrorism of State", a term coined to denote the disappearance of many dissidents and serious violation to human rights, is used with a different meaning than in the United States. The United States uses it against an external enemy; in Argentina it refers only to the doctrine of dirty war, as in the 1970s.

CONCLUSION

Argentina's bombings of Jewish establishments in Buenos Aires contrasts with 9/11 in the United States, but reveals the same kinds of underlying issues. Tourism is a sensitive measure of reactions to terrorist events precisely because it also represents those same underlying issues. Tourists come from positions of wealth and power. Tourists come from developed and politically stable, relatively economically secure societies. One thinks of the ubiquity of Japanese, American and Western European tourists throughout the globe. One does not think of, or see, tourists from central Africa or western Asia unless they are of the elite classes. If secure, they travel; if not, they stay home. American tourists stayed home shortly after 9/11. They remain wary of certain locales where there might be centers of reputed terrorists, but otherwise they have regained their confidence, especially after US military adventures once again demonstrated American might. Argentine citizens remained relatively unaffected by the bombings. They did however avoid the bombed sites themselves, as sort of pariah sites where one could be infected by the victimhood of the bombed. It would be interesting to know further as to how the attacks in Argentina were desacralized. Ground Zero had martyrs; it became a sacred site and a tourist destination. The Israeli embassy and AMIA were ignored; shunned and avoided. The one sacralized; the other desacralized.

The other part of the equation pertains to terrorism. Since terrorism at least that with political aims, is a form of asymmetric warfare, isolated terrorist acts, like 9/11 and the Buenos Aires bombings, represent the terrorism of the weak against the strong. Drone attacks, continual aerial bombardment, and invasion are the terrorism of the strong against the weak. Americans after 9/11 feared attacks from individuals, not a competing world power. Twenty-first century Americans were not bound together by their ideals. They only had shared fears and consumerist desires. Apathetic obedience replaced determined and righteous, if misguided, antagonism to Communism. Frederic Jameson articulated the transition from an obsession with communism toward terrorism.

Marxian opposition to terrorism is an old and established tradition. It is important to remember that "terrorism," as a "concept," is also an ideology of the right and must therefore be refused in that form. Along with disaster films of the late 60s and 70s, mass culture itself makes clear that "terrorism"—the image of the "terrorist"—is one of the privileged forms in which an a-historical society imagines radical social change; meanwhile, an inspection of the content of the modern thriller or adventure story also makes clear that the "otherness" of so-called terrorism has begun to replace older images of criminal "insanity" as an unexamined and seemingly "natural" motivation in the construction of plots—yet another sign of the ideological nature of this particular pseudo-concept. Understood in this way, "terrorism" is a collective obsession, a symptomatic fantasy of the American political unconscious, which demands decoding and analysis in its own right.

Tourism measures this ideologeme. It interrogates the collective obsession of the American (US) political unconscious. In Argentina, the terrorists were the strong—the strong men of the juntas, the perpetrators of dirty wars. In the United States, the terrorists were the weak, those whom the

US state and American imperial hegemony had been oppressing and exploiting for many decades. But at the center of both, Argentina and the United.

This research, to here, evidenced how different can be the followed policies in one country and another, the responses of societies and their processes of resilience. Last but not least, even though in Argentina there is not an overt discrimination or racist expression against Jew community, the adaptative response was to cover the problem of terrorism. Likely, this happened not because ethnic problems but by the fear these types of attacks wake up. This accelerated a process of exclusion and isolation for Jew institutions. The sentiment of fright, terrorism often manipulates, may engender these two reactions, indifference or commitments. Significant comparative research should be conducted in these types of issues.

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